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Administrative Law: The Hidden
Comparative Law Course
Peter L. Strauss
What does today's Administrative Law course give your students that you
might not be aware of and might be helped by knowing? That, as I understand
it, is the question I am to answer. But we may also want to think about the
overall shape of the curriculum: it may be useful to ask about fundamental
issues our students may not be aware of, that may not be dealt with elsewhere in
the law school curriculum. I'll spend most of my time on the question I've
been asked to address, but I hope you will accept a few sentences on this
second question. For administrative lawyers, that probable gap remains the
one Harold Lasswell and Myres MacDougal suggested long ago, that contem-
porary law studies should include explicit instruction in the skills of public
policy analysis-in particular, how to evaluate the need for and probable
effectiveness of regulation.
Administrative Law is the hidden comparative law course of the public law
and adjectival law curriculum. In myjudgment, that is its main contribution to
your students' appreciation for your own subjects. Its students come to grips
again and again with problems whose contrasts with those of the standard
court-centered curriculum can illuminate their other courses. The common
thread here is in the rather pragmatic adjustments legislatures and courts
have made to the exigencies of the administrative state, in the face of legal
theories developed in the simpler theoretical world of one-function institu-
tions and individual rights. Ideology and theory have rarely prevailed in
competition with function and necessity.' Although the situation may be
changing, as we shall have to discuss, Administrative Law repeatedly confronts
its students with doctrinal differences driven by "the necessity of the case,"
which can illuminate standard courses as well as our own. I'm going to give a
few examples, proceeding in alphabetical order through the curriculum and
stressing those developments that are more recent in origin.
Let's start with Civil Procedure, although usually we get your students
rather than vice versa. While we could identify many candidates here-
Peter L. Strauss is Betts Professor of Law at Columbia University.
1. This way of putting the "tension between ideology and necessity" was suggested by my
colleague Michael Young. See Michael IL Young & Constance Hamilton, Introduction to
Japanese Law, inJapan Business Law Guide 2251 (Sydney, 1988).
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discovery techniques, for example-two are particularly compelling: charac-
terizing the discretion of an initial decision-maker in relation to judicial
review, and determining what procedures are fair. The standard-of-review
question is rather old hat, yet I find my students constantly challenged in
thinking about administrative fact-finding by the issues that arise on appellate
review of trial court fact-finding. Being made to walk through comparisons of
both the standards courts articulate and the reasons they ascribe for respect-
ing the judgment of the lower tribunal is invariably revealing. My late col-
league Maury Rosenberg's writings about the discretion of trial judges have
parallels in issues of administrative discretion that warrant-and have not
often received-close attention.
Evaluating claims about what procedures are due is the more contempo-
rary issue; here, Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law may also come
into play. Where Criminal Procedure draws on the Bill of Rights' rather
explicit listing of necessary elements, and Civil Procedure often plays off the
long history of common law courts, we administrative lawyers have no formal
grounding beyond the capacious words due process, life, liberty, property, and
deprived, appearing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Theories about
incorporation cannot begin to reduce the uncertainties, as they could for
criminal procedure;judicial recognition from the outset that agencies are not
courts has sapped the common law history of process rights in civil proceed-
ings of force it might otherwise have had. And thus we find ourselves in the
position of having to accommodate function and necessity.
The possibilities were defined before the recent years I've been asked to
address: the baseline assertion that adjudication must involve notice of the
government's case and opportunities for presenting evidence and orally ad-
dressing the tribunal;2 the choice among analytic techniques that are in turn
holistic, 3 prescriptive, 4 and cost-beneficial; 5 recognition that issues of tiiing
are often at the heart of the difficulty. What the contemporary cases and
analyses do, in my judgment, is illuminate in a particularly lawyerly way the
difficulties of reaching judgment-and the consequent high temptation to
rely on legislative judgments, at least those that cannot be shown to have been
infected by special interestjudgments adverse to those arguably entitled to a
fair hearing.
We have not been able to generate stable theory about when and what
process is due. In almost the same breath as it rejected the outworn and
unworthy dichotomy between right and privilege as the threshold of due
process, for example, the Supreme Court restored it by another name. Lawless
injuries to undoubted citizen interests have been left to uncertain remedies-
for example, a student must bring a speculative tort action to redress physical
2. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
3. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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harm inflicted by a teacher's summary use of corporal punishment-out of
fear that constitutional doctrine might displace traditional state common law.
Jury claims have been rejected on the strength of legislative categorizations
that might, in themselves, have been thought suspect.
Two of my casebook colleagues have written wonderfully about the difficul-
ties and potential of due process analysis: Cynthia R. Farina, asking if feminist
perspectives can help to reconceptualize the field,6 and Todd D. Rakoff,
asking if taking "the new property" seriously will not require us to think about
due process quite differently in regulatory than in beneficiary contexts.7 For
me, who have not written, the best classroom time is spent asking whether, if
the precedents do not decide concrete cases very well, they at least serve to
give structure to litigation about procedural issues. Mathews v. Eldridge' put in
place a series of concrete questions to be asked about procedures whose
constitutional adequacy is challenged: what private and governmental inter-
ests are affected, how great is the risk of error prejudicing the private interest,
and what are the likely contribution and the likely cost of particular additional
procedures. In other words, a rather particularistic cost-benefit analysis is
prescribed.
If this does not answer the question, it does tell you how to build your case
to be persuasive; and this approach seems equally relevant to any procedural
context where the Constitution's text itself does not answer the matter. In
Walters v. NationalAssociation of Radiation SurvivorP a substantial majority of the
Court rejected the proposition that some procedures-in that case, a claimed
right to the assistance of counsel-could simply be supplied as a matter of
constitutional common law history. As in so many other contexts, the Court
has not been consistent in its attention to this analytic framework. Yet to the
extent your students are aware of it, they will wonder why a similar inquiry is
not inade in civil and criminal procedural matters as well. Or, to put the
matter another way, these settings share a central question: What procedures best
accommodate the tensions among accuracy, efficiency, and fairness? How is that
question to be answered? And why should it be answered using different
analytic techniques in civil, criminal, and administrative contexts?
The second curricular area I want to talk about is Constitutional Law. Here
the issues are less comparison than supplementation-Administrative Law
often seems like the institutional constitutional law course-but recent devel-
opments respecting separation of powers well illustrate the difficulties for
theory posed by our history of muddling along problem to problem, respond-
ing to the perceived necessity of the case. My first illustration concerns the
6. Conceiving Due Process, 3 YaleJ.L. & Feminism 189 (1991).
7. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev.
157.
8. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
9. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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president's" directory authority over the work of the executive branch; the
second, relatedly, the nature of the appointments authority.
Arguments about the strength of the presidency have been around since
the founding, but they became urgent with the explosion of separation-of-
powers litigation that followed Watergate and, in particular, the strong efforts
of Presidents Reagan and Bush to seize control of the federal bureaucracy
from 1981 forward. These were the institutional realities by that point: an
extraordinarily diverse government, with decisional authority clearly placed in
agencies of varying type, and not in the White House. The case law so far has
sustained those assignments, from independent prosecutors'I to the Sentenc-
ing Commission,12 but against increasingly forceful protests from "originalist"
justices whose views in other respects have often prevailed. One also notes in
the literature a groundswell of support for the idea of a unitary presidency. 3
Since the Constitution places all executive authority in one president, this
argument runs, that president must himself have the authority to direct the
exercise of whatever discretion Congress may confer on the executive branch.
Probably I don't have to spell out the tyrannical implications of the argu-
ment, 4 but a concrete example may be helpful. Waivers of the Endangered
10. The author and the editors disagree over whether the elected head of the Executive Branch
should get the same capitalization treatment as the Congress and the [Supreme] Court. He
thinks that the President is a unique institution in the same way the Court is, and that
separation-of-powers principles call for capitalizing references to that fnstitution/office
equally with the others. The President and a dogcatcher differ in just the way the Court and
a court do. In this respect, he thinks the Chicago Manual of Style, which the editors generally
follow, is wrong as a matter of principle. For the editors, president and dogcatcher get the
same treatment. The editors'judgment has controlled, with the exception of this footnote,
which they include at the author's request. They and he would like to hear from any reader
who has a view on the issue.
11. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
12. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
13. E.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of
Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987); Steven G. Calabresi &
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 1153 (1992);Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. LJ. 671 (1992); Martin H. Redish &
Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in
Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449 (1991); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers
and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513 (1991); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41. Symposia on the subject include 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 331
(1990), 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 209 (1989), 1988 Duke L.J. 215, and 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 277
(1987).
14. They were put best by Edward S. Corwin:
Suppose... that the law casts a duty upon a subordinate executive agency eo
nomine, does the President thereupon become entitled, by virtue of his
.executive power" or of his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," to substitute his ownjudgment for that of the agency regarding the
discharge of such duty? An unqualified answer to this question would invite
startling results. An affirmative answer would make all questions of law
enforcement questions of discretion, the discretion moreover of an
independent and legally uncontrollable branch of the government. By the
same token, it would render it impossible for Congress, notwithstanding its
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Species Act's ordinary ban on activities that could be harmful to protected
species are made the responsibility of an extraordinary high-level commission
convened ad hoc; its members include cabinet secretaries and the heads of
the Council of Economic Advisers and the EPA. They are to reach their
conclusions following statutorily specified procedures. The commission was
called upon in the well-known struggles over the spotted owl and logging in
the virgin rainforests of the Northwest, and President Bush took the position
that as president he was entitled to give private instructions to the commission-
ers, some of whom worked in the White House itself and all of whom served at
his pleasure. The Ninth Circuit had relatively little difficulty rejecting the
claim. " But what your students will have seen is that the claim was made
without embarrassment, and that its rejection was limited by the court to the
on-the-record adjudicatory context in which it concluded the case arose.
Suppose instead the authority being exercised was the authority to adopt
rules, a context where your students will also have been exposed to a very
considerable apparatus for presidential guidance of agency effort that has
grown up. May the president insist upon substituting his own judgment here,
despite the statutory assignment of responsibility to the agency? The increas-
ing importance of theories of political responsibility suggests at least the
possibility that the strength of the presidency is on the verge of a dramatic
increase.
What seems to be building in interpretation of the Appointments Clause is
a tension between the formalism of an originalist approach to interpretation
and the functional realities of today's federal government worthy of the San
Andreas fault; its release at the wrong place will leave few of our government
structures standing. Freytag v. Commissioney'6 is a little-noticed case, because it
reached an unexciting conclusion. The litigation challenged the power of the
chiefjudge of the Tax Court to appoint specialjudges with master-like powers,
and the case held that grant of authority constitutional. In the course of
getting to that unexciting conclusion, however, the Court revived a late-
nineteenth-century proposition-also expressed in the course of getting to an
obvious decision-that the "departments" the Constitution occasionally refers
to are only the cabinet departments; it gave an expansive reading to who is a
constitutional "officer of the United States," and therefore may be appointed
broad powers under the "necessary and proper" clause, to leave anything to
the specially trained judgment of a subordinate executive official with any
assurance that his discretion would not be perverted to political ends for the
advantage of the administration in power. At the same time, a flatly negative
answer would hold out consequences equally unwelcome. Itwould, as Attorney
General Cushing quaintly phrased it, leave it open to Congress so to divide
and transfer "the executive power" by statute as to change the government
"into a parliamentary despotism like that of Venezuela or Great Britain, with a
nominal executive chief or president, who, however, would remain without a
shred of actual power."
The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957, 4th rev. ed., 80-81 (NewYork, 1957) (quoting
7 Op. Att'y Gen. 470 (1855)).
15. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
16. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
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only as authorized by the Appointments Clause; and it nailed these proposi-
tions down with a perfectly attractive originalist account of the reasons for
limiting the right to appoint in the executive branch to the president and his
politically closest associates.
Do you see where this is going? Forget about the independent agencies and
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (although in a characteristic footnote
the Court professed confidence it was not threatening them). If a special
judge of the Tax Court is an officer of the United States for Appointments
Clause purposes because of the authority she wields, so certainly is an adminis-
trative law judge in the Department of the Interior; so is an Agriculture
Department bureau chief serving in the Senior Executive Service of the Civil
Service; and so is a deputy general counsel of the Environmental Protection
Agency who owes his appointment to the EPA's general counsel or at best its
administrator-neither of whom is the president or the head of a cabinet
department exercising a prerogative the Constitution says can be given only to
that very small group of high political officials. This is not about whether
Congress can limit removal authority, a less important proposition, although
in myjudgment one also settled by the course of history. It is about how widely
it can confer appointments authority, and what Freytag said, on readily appre-
ciated originalist principles, seems quite capable of bringing down our gov-
ernment, as we understand it.
What I think constitutional law teachers can usefully be aware of, then, is
that their students in Administrative Law may be spending a lot of time
dealing with the proposition that the conventional arrangements of our
government are at the moment under concerted assault-and that, indeed,
there is some chance that the assaults will prevail. If we cannot continue to
find our way past the demands and implications of theory and consistency, it is
unlikely we will be able to continue to sustain the institutional arrangements
that have become so familiar in this century.
In Criminal Procedure, your students might be asking, in the largest dimen-
sion, why we don't regard prosecutors-executive officials exercising a kind of
delegated authority-as a part of the apparatus of administrative law, and
subject to its various constraints and disciplines. Kenneth Culp Davis persua-
sively raised that question over a quarter of a century ago,"7 and it is still
awaiting response. 8 Less universally, interesting implicit comparisons and
accommodations include the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Again, this is not
new; the idea that self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure
might have different meanings in administrative and criminal contexts has
been present for half a century. Regulatory government cannot function
without means of access to information and requirements for cooperation
with government that the libertarian premises of criminal law enforcement
17. DiscretionaryJustice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge, 1969).
18. Aspects of the question were raised on last term's Supreme Court calendar. See United States
v. Melendez, 116 S. Ct. 2057 (1996); United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
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would inevitably deny. The difficulties, nonetheless, have been recently cap-
tured and highlighted.
Take, for example, the Court's decision nine years ago in New York v.
Burger,19 involving a warrantless inspection of an automobile junkyard that, as
it happened, disclosed considerable evidence of trafficking in stolen automo-
bile parts. Probable cause was not claimed; no warrant had been obtained. In
the event, the search was carried out by uniformed police, and it was con-
ducted even after the junkyard's owners had admitted that they lacked the
licenses and records that were the only significant requirements of the admin-
istrative scheme officials were purporting to enforce. The majority upheld the
search, invoking the permissive administrative search rules that had been
developed for pervasively regulated entities like underground mines. A dis-
sent fairly argued that only criminal enforcement purposes and only criminal
law enforcers were apparent; indeed, the New York Court of Appeals had
unanimously concluded that "providing the police an expedient means of
enforcing penal sanctions" was the statutory scheme's solejustification in state
policy. The strongly arguable misuse of an administrative law approach in this
case underscores the uneasy character of an accommodation that arguably
must be made when the stakes are prospective assurance of community health
or safety through more cooperative and remedy-generating measures.
So, too, if you treat the Fifth Amendment, you probably talk about the
suspect in the station house, or on her way there. Braswell v. United Stat9 °
focuses attention on the accommodations made to regulatory government's
insatiable appetite for information and to the special problems posed in
dealing with collective entities-entities that, on the one hand, owe their very
existence to the state and that, on the other, inevitably act through representa-
tives who may be targets of investigation and thus understand that their
compelled production of entity records will raise a high personal risk of
criminal prosecution. Randy Braswell was the sole shareholder of two Missis-
sippi corporations that came under criminal tax investigation. He resisted a
subpoena to produce corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds, argu-
ing that his very act of producing the records would be incriminatory; the
Court found this defense unavailing, fashioning a limited immunity against
government use of the act of producing the records-but not their contents.
Again, the particular result is questionable-it was not so often that one found
Justices Kennedy and Brennan, Marshall and Scalia, together in dissent. Yet
the accommodations that permitted this particular struggle over characteriza-
tion are not questionable or questioned. Unanimously accepted, grounded in
the realities of the mixed economy and of the administrative state, they may
provide a counterpoint for your students that it will be useful for you to be
aware of.
Now, Evidence. Here, I have to say, is a setting in which for years our side of
the problem has been clearer to me than finding an effective way to bring
19. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
,20. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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students to deal with it. Nor do I know of discrete developments within the
decade that will help to illuminate it. One evidentiary comparison, of course,
is commonplace: the more casual approach of administrative tribunals to
witness facts, conventionally presented. The administrative trial need not
follow the Federal Rules or worry about the technicalities of hearsay, and the
student who knows this will have a possibly useful footing for question. The
issues that concern me, however, are those of more general fact, both issues of
judgment that are easy to call legislative and impersonal propositions, like the
effect of a certain degree of thermal shock upon the viability of soft-shelled
clam larvae, that seem more hard-edged and scientific in character.
We administrative lawyers have been responsible for inflicting an analytic
mode upon the world of evidence in general-Ken Davis's influential distinc-
tion between legislative and adjudicatory fact 2 -and what I have to report is
that in our classrooms, at least, that distinction is most likely to be painted as
inadequate. Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence not only embraces the
distinction for deciding questions of judicial notice at trial, but also leaves
judges scot-free on the legislative fact side of that divide. Yet as we have
become more and more concerned with high-consequence rulemaking in the
administrative state-a setting from which the discipline of trial is in fact
absent-the inadequacies of Davis's distinction have become more and more
clear. We do not require trials; but neither do we permit agencies to find
rulemaking facts of a general, but concrete, character simply by consulting
books in the library or agency expertise. We expect revelation, ventilation,
explanation in a public process not required of a legislature-or, for that
matter, in thejudgmental determinations that most easily fit Ken Davis's polar
model. This paper hearing process, which Richard B. Stewart once called the
"tertium quid,12 survived the Supreme Court's repudiation of trial proce-
dures for rulemaking in the Vermont YankeeP case; healthy and still growing,
the paper hearing adopts a sort of science model for fact-finding that also
influences current legislative proposals on cost-benefit analysis and risk assess-
ment. What are adequate, efficient, and fair procedures for determining
contested propositions about the impact of pollutants, pesticides, drugs, and
worker risk are questions we share and on which we might be able to make
common progress.
In relation to Federal Courts, overlaps may be substantial; problems of
access to the federal judiciary are at the heart of both our endeavors; issues
like standing are in flux today. Perhaps Administrative Law students will be in
a better position than most to relate that shifting analysis to apparently
changing judicial attitudes towards the role of regulatory beneficiaries. The
21. Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945 (1955).
22. The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 733
(1977).
23. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
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great expansion of the late '60s and '70s in public interest law, which many
claimed to reflect a new paradigm for the field, has ended. The courts are
noting more pointedly, it seems, that regulatory subjects and regulatory ben-
eficiaries do not have equal claims to judicial relief.
The development I particularly want to note is again one of seeing separa-
tion of powers at work in Congress's particular design of government institu-
tions. What perhaps we supply are the headwaters for one stream of alterna-
tive tribunals, whose work is the result of congressional assignment of what
could be judicial business away from the federal courts. That is, we provide a
concrete setting for your students to encounter the problems of Henry Hart's
famous exercise in dialectic. And for administrative agencies, more than for
the more conventional Article I courts, that assignment has often enough
expressed a measure of hostility or distrust toward the judiciary. In creating
workers' compensation tribunals, legislatures were notjust seeking the advan-
tages of expertise, or some means of relieving courts from the most routine
elements of a generally excessive caseload. Legislatures did not trust courts to
do the work they had in mind, with reason, and so set up a competing tribunal
that they thought would do that work more reliably. In this sense, the delega-
tion of adjudicatory authority to agencies should set up as large and central a
puzzle as delegation of legislative authority.
Thus, alongside the Article I court difficulties of recent years-Freytag
comes again to mind-your students may well be placing CF'C v. Schor.2 4 That
case directly concerned the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's au-
thority to decide a counterclaim based on state common law, in a proceeding
that was initially brought by a disappointed investor to enforce aspects of the
CFTC's regulations against a regulated broker. Assuming the propriety of
giving the commission authority to decide disputes between customers and
brokers about the enforcement of its rules, the Court upheld its decision of
the counterclaim functionally, on what might be understood as pendent
jurisdiction grounds. But the challenge of explaining how Congress can make
that derivative assignment consistent with Article III is less troubling than the
question the Court treated as routine-Congress's assignment to a special-
ized, nonjudicial agency of the task of collecting reparations between citizens
for violations of agency rules. An action by one citizen to collect money from
another is not easily characterized as one involving "public rights," even when
the basis for the action is an agency rule rather than a statute. Indeed, one
could argue that permitting the agency to decide the matter compounds the
problems of separation of powers created both by initial delegation of
rulemaking authority and by the decision to place rulemaking and decisional
authority in the same place. We can see that Congress has often made such
judgments, and that pragmatically we have long accepted them, but we have
no very convincing way to explain them-particularly when we acknowledge,
as we must, that the historical roots of these assignments lie in distrust of the
judiciary and the wish significantly to displace it. As the Fifth Circuit recently
remarked, the agency context reveals "Itlhe public rights/private rights di-
24. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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chotomy of Crowell and Murray's Lessee is a deceptively weak decisional tool."2
Or, as Harold H. Bruff has put it, "the Supreme Court cases are notoriously
obscure.'26 Here, then, is a setting in which the competition between ideology
and theory, on the one hand, and function and necessity, on the other, seems
particularly acute.
In Legislation, too, administrative law is likely to raise comparative issues
for your students, respecting both the bromide that the courts have complete
authority to determine what statutes mean, and the current brouhaha about
the uses, if any, of legislative history.
At least as early as 1940 the Supreme Court found it possible to affirm in the
same opinion that statutory interpretation in justiciable controversies "is
exclusively a judicial function," and that agency views of statutory meaning
"are entitled to great weight."27 This is not really a paradox. First, a court
genuinely wishing to be cooperative with legislatures, as the newly chastened
courts were in the wake of the defeat of substantive due process, could
rationally find signals for its own interpretation in the behavior of the agencies
the legislature had assigned to implement legislation. That Congress was
creating so many agencies was itself a signal of unhappiness with judicial
activism, generallyjudicial resistance to legislative policies, which the courts of
that time doubtless understood. Second, a court independently interpreting a
statute could nonetheless find in it an unmistakable instruction that certain
policy issues, which might appear in the guise of disputes over statutory
meaning, had been left to the agency to decide. Respecting reasonable agency
judgments in such cases was only a matter of obeying the instruction the court
had independently found the statute to contain.28
These ideas found fresh and rather emphatic expression in the Supreme
Court's unanimous opinion in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,29 a case I imagine as familiar ground and certainly a prominent
part of your students' Administrative Law study. Chevron reiterated the two-
step approach to statutory construction that had been evident in the earlier
cases: first the court determines whether there are clear congressional instruc-
tions on the issue before it; then, finding an issue not resolved, and finding an
assignment of relevant policy-settirig responsibility to an administrative agency,
it tests the agency approach for reasonableness. Congress had not decided
whether or not the EPA could treat the whole of an industrial site as one
stationary source for purposes of air pollution regulation; the EPA'sjudgment
that that would be the optimal approach to regulation was to be accepted as
25. In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994) (referring to Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1856)).
26. Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 329, 353 (1991).
27. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544,549 (1940).
28. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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long as it was "reasonable." Save for making a general principle out of what
previously had been found in particular statutes, and for its (in my judgment,
healthy) tying of the proposition to political controls, the opinion is not nearly
so surprising as the enormous literature it has generated would suggest. Yet
the attention it has received is of a piece with the revival of theorizing about
separation of powers issues, and in that respect may signal instability rather
than stability in the paradigm it expresses. Certainly, Chevron's inconsistent
treatment by the Court in recent years, of which the literature is interestingly
full, suggests that the opinion may have done more to define a coming field of
battle than to express well-settled truths, as its rhetoric appeared to claim.
That field of battle, I think we all know, is over the right relationship of
legislature and courts when it comes to statutory interpretation. As Thomas W.
Merrill recently documented, we have moved from a practice in 1981, shortly
before Chevron, when legislative history played a part in 100 percent of the
Court's statutory interpretation cases and dictionaries played a part in one
percent, to a world of 1992, in which legislative history was seriously consulted
in less than one case in five, and dictionaries were referred to about twice as
often.30 That trend is not abating.3' What I hope I can briefly suggest here is
that the context and the consequences of this dispute for administrative
agencies and administrative law are rather different than for the ordinary case
in which court and legislature deal directly with each other's work product.3 2
Your student who has had Administrative Law will have been dealing with this
issue in a somewhat more complex situation, in which the interpreter-that is,
the agency-has important and continuing relationships with Congress and
the White House as well as with the courts. Caught in a crossfire, it is not free,
and we might not wish it to be free, to disregard the signals coming from all
directions. And it is in an expert position vis-A-vis the legislative process that
might render some of the current skepticism about legislative history less
persuasive-you may think, in other respects more persuasive-than would be
the case for the only occasionally involved and policy-neutral courts. Agencies
are chosen for their qualities of cooperation with the political leadership of
government; when we want neutrality we choose the courts. But if, then, as it
seems, we are entering a time when the dominant judicial stance towards the
legislature is one of distance rather than cooperation, the tensions between
administrative and judicial approaches to statutory materials and charges are
likely to be rather high.
With more time, we could investigate other comparisons, which reach into
the private law curriculum: public contracts present revealing problems in
relation to Contracts, the issues of public liability present important issues for
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Administrative Law: The Hidden Comparative Law Course
Torts, and "the New Property" of course figures in Property. These are more
peripheral to Administrative Law, however; and here, too, I am reasonably
confident that our students know what you teach, rather than vice versa, in the
usual ordering of the curriculum.
Rather, let me take just a moment to suggest some issues that we don't yet
sufficiently encounter, and that from an administrative lawyer's perspective
bid strongly to become significant elements of the curriculum of the future.
These might all, perhaps, be caught up in the need for reinventing govern-
ment, to coin a phrase-for finding new paradigms for government structure
and action that correspond to the new forms of corporate organization and
thinking. Similar challenges, I imagine, are faced by colleagues teaching
'courses like Corporations. They entail not only drawing extensively on the
work of other social sciences-economics, game theory, and public choice in
particular-but also imagining different legal regimes suited to the challenges
thus created. Seduced, perhaps, by the appearance of deregulation in the
familiar contexts of economic controls, we provide scant room in our cur-
ricula for the newer issues of "regulation," such as are reflected in the intellec-
tual disciplines of cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis, or in the increasing
calls for performance- rather than standards-based approaches to the identifi-
cation and achievement of government's ends.
Probably this is not the forum for addressing these problems of curricular
reform-although, as you may know, we at Columbia are making a stab at it.
For today our issue is what our students may know that you may not, and not
what the future ought to hold but the present lacks. And I hope to have given
you a few ways to think about perspectives that your Administrative Law
colleagues may contribute to your students' understanding, and indeed that
you might find useful to enrich your own scholarship, as I find conversations
with you about your fields enrich mine. To end where I began, Administrative
Law is the hidden comparative law course of the public law and adjectival law
curriculum; bringing that characteristic into the open gives your work and
mine added interest.
